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1.   Introduction  
Policy makers in the southern Africa region have the big challenge of reconciling domestic and foreign 
policy, in order to maintain stability in food supply and prices. Improving intra-regional trade, through 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff measures has been widely advocated for as a critical piece in the food 
insecurity puzzle. Recommendation have included the facilitation of freer grain movement to address 
isolated shortfalls (SADC FANR  2003,  Mano 2003), simplification and harmonization of trade 
regulations (Tschirley et al 2004), and integration of the region into the global markets (World Bank 
DTIS studies 2004) as critical components of a comprehensive food strategy. Production and 
consumption trends in the region indicate that although the region is on net, a surplus producer of cereals 
(SADC FANR, 2003),  significant food insecurity persists in parts of the region (1/3 of the SADC 
population, WDI 2005) – a result of severe inter and intra-seasonal supply and price fluctuations.  As 
policy makers increasingly turn to alternative supply sources to stabilize local output, regional markets 
become as important in addressing food security issues as domestic markets. However, the lack of a clear 
understanding of the welfare effects of specific trade policy options on individual countries and 
economic groups, necessary to reduce ambiguity in policy recommendations and to accurately anticipate 
potential negative effects, has forced countries to remain significantly closed with regards to trade in 
food commodities. Efforts to quantify micro and macro level benefits from freer trade in grains in the 
region have been limited, and specific effects of trade reforms remain largely unknown
1. This study 
contributes towards bringing quantitative evidence to the trade – food policy debate, through evaluation 
of the price and welfare effects of tariff reforms in the cereals sector of the southern Africa region. The 
specific objectives are to (1) compute the expected price responses to tariff reforms in the cereals sector, 
(2) assess the potential welfare implications on consumers and producers in each country of the region, 
and (3) establish the potential effects of these reforms on price responsiveness to external supply shocks.    
 
                                                   
1 Previous literature has either focused on evaluating welfare effects at a broad macro level (Chauvin et al 2002, Poonyth et al 2002, Jere 
2002, Kahuika 2002, Madola et al 2002, Mafusire 2002, Mukherje 1996),  or on understanding trade policy (SADC FANR, 1996-2005) and 
monitoring cross-border grain movements (FEWS/WFP, 2004-2005).   2
2.   Trade Policy and Food Security in Southern Africa   
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region is an integration block made up of 14 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). Through mostly unilateral national policy, countries of the SADC 
region have undergone market liberalization policy reforms in the past two decades, aimed at promoting 
freer trade among members. Although SADC is not a regional trading block per se, promoting intra-
regional trade has become one of its core objectives, as evidenced by the ratification of the  Trade 
Protocol in 2000, under which countries agreed to gradually phase-out tariffs in most economic sectors 
by 2012. In addition, half of SADC  countries  are  already  members in autonomous free trading 
agreements (FTAs) in existence in SSA: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), under which trade is either tariff-free (SACU), or 
almost tariff-free (COMESA). Despite these reforms, intra-regional trade in southern Africa remains low, 
accounting for about 5% of total trade, and trade restrictions are maintained in most strategic sectors. 
Regional trade in  grains (especially the region’s staple – maize) is a case in point, subject to tariffs 
averaging 12%, import and export regulatory requirements, and special sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
restrictions.  Trade policy in this sector remains marred with unpredictability, often justified as being 
necessary to stabilize producer incomes and food prices (Mano et al, 2003; Jayne et al, 2005). Extra-
regional exports are observed (23% of total exports), even as severe food shortages persist in parts of the 
region (SADC Food Security Network, 2003). Cross-hauling is also observed (24% of total regional 
trade), and policy coordination on pertinent issues such as production and sale of genetically modified 
(GM)  grains  is  limited.  South Africa and Zimbabwe are the only countries with clear legislation on 
production and sale of GM grain, but even for these countries, regulations differ.  
On a sub-regional level, distinct features of trade policy can be identified. Member of SACU: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa, have relatively low tariffs (the same across 
all SACU countries) on trade with the SADC region
2. No licenses are required for trade, although special 
                                                   
2 In South Africa, for example, tariff protection on maize is based on a tariff band formula which delivers a tariff only when world prices fall 
below US $110/ton US Gulf coast free-on-board prices - current tariff rates on maize are 0%.    3
SPS measures and tariff quota restrictions apply for some commodities
3. Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
– the SADC countries that are also members of COMESA – also enjoy tariff-free trade with each other 
for most cereal products, though having autonomous policies on trade with the rest of the world (ROW). 
These  countries also have a similar state-interventionist history in their cereals production and trade 
policy however, with market oriented reforms implemented in the past few years, countries have adopted 
more liberal trade policy. In Malawi tariffs on maize grain have been eliminated, though import licenses 
are required to engage in trade, and tariffs of up to 25% are maintained for products such as wheat flour. 
Zambia has no import license requirements for trade in cereals, but imports are subject to tariffs of up to 
25%, and numerous antidumping, rules of origin and SPS measures
4. For Zimbabwe, cereal imports are 
subject to relatively high tariff rates (up to 30%), and several SPS restrictions. Import levies are generally 
applied on imports, such as the US$3.50/50kg bag levied on private imports of maize grain, maize meal 
or rice in excess of one bag (FEWNET 2005). Only the state trading enterprise – the Grain Marketing 
Board (GMB) – has legal authority to engage in, or provide license for, trade of grains. Ad-hoc policy 
shifts are not uncommon. Mozambique’s cereals sector, one of the least protected in the region, has tariff 
rates ranging between 2.5 and 7.5%, higher only for wheat and maize flour at 25%. Nonetheless, trade is 
governed by trading licenses, extensive inspections, and non-trivial taxes. In Tanzania, exports are 
generally restricted, trade can only be conducted through state-issued licenses, and an almost flat tariff 
rate of 25% is  applied to imports of cereals and cereal products. Tanzania trades more closely with 
Uganda and Kenya under the East African Community (EAC) than with SADC in import/export of 
cereals.  A summary of selected descriptive statistics on the structure of the cereals sector of the SADC 
region between 1999 and 2002
5 – the study period – is presented in Table 1, where Angola, DRC and 
Mauritius are aggregated into ‘other SADC’, and Madagascar, SADC’s newest addition, is excluded 
from the analysis. In accordance with the GSIM model discussed in Section 3, the variables 
‘imports/exports’ include trade with self (local production consumed locally, valued at world prices). 
 
                                                   
3 South Africa applies tariff quota restrictions of 269,000tons for maize, 108,279 tons for wheat, and 21,116 tons sorghum. 
4 The Zambian government for example, maintains, and has used, the right to ban exports during poor harvest seasons. 
5 2002 tariff rates may differ from current rates, where countries have engaged in further reforms.   4
Table 1: Descriptive statistics – SADC Cereals sector, 1999-2002 
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Botswana  9.0  4.0  S.Africa (61.5)  S.Africa (39.2)  26.4  1.6  SACU  
Lesotho  9.0  4.0  S.Africa (51.4)  S.Africa (18.5)  81.4  45.6  SACU  
Malawi  16.0  6.0  S.Africa (9.4)  Zimbabwe (0.1)  98.5  72.7  COMESA 
Mozambique  9.0  5.0  S.Africa (3.0)  Malawi (4.6)  94.8  76.0  - 
Namibia  9.0  4.0  S.Africa (31.4)  Angola (9.0)  90.3  41.2  SACU  
South Africa   9.0  4.0  Lesotho (0.3)  Botswana (1.8)  87.7  87.0  SACU 
Swaziland   9.0  4.0  S.Africa (67.2)  S.Africa (12.9)  82.6  31.0  SACU  
Tanzania  25.0  25.0  S.Africa (0.4)  Malawi (0.55)  98.1  86.0   EAC 
Zambia   12.0  8.0  S.Africa (8.0)  Zimbabwe (0.2)  98.3  86.2  COMESA 
Zimbabwe   20.0  16.0  S.Africa (5.2)  Botswana (2.7)  94.4  91.2  COMESA 
Other SADC   12.0  12.0  S.Africa (2.6)  Zambia (0.03)  97.7  42.7   - 
 
The  structure of the industry and the nature of existing  trade relations among SADC countries,  are 
expected to influence  the welfare gains  from implementing region-wide tariff reforms for specific 
countries and country sub-groups. For example,  welfare effects on net-exporters to the SADC region 
(South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) are expected to differ from those expected on net 
importers, with producer surplus responses from a given price change expected to always exceed the 
consumer surplus response from an equivalent price change; whereas the opposite is expected for net 
importers. The effects of tariff reforms for countries already participating in one or more regional FTAs 
may also differ non-trivially from those expected for the rest SADC, as implementing region-wide tariff 
reforms in these countries may result in preference erosion. Generally, we expect regional tariff reforms 
to lead to either trade creation through increased trade volumes among existing regional trading partners, 
or trade diversion, as new trading partners established within the region replace trade with the ROW. 
Accordingly, trade creation  is strictly beneficial for the countries within the FTA, and at least as 
beneficial for the rest of the world, since it leads to increased overall trade volumes. Trade diversion, on 
the other hand, generally causes welfare loss to both the importing country (through the shifting of 
imports to a more expensive regional source, and through revenue losses) and the ROW (through lost 
trade).  Therefore  the welfare impacts of a FTA are  generally ambiguous a priori, and depend 
considerably on the extent to which trade creation effects exceed the trade diversion effects (Hoekman 
and Scheiff 2002).    5
3.  The Model 
The global simulation model (GSIM), due to Francois and Hall (2003), was used in this analysis to 
estimate the potential welfare effects of tariff reforms implemented in thirteen SADC countries.  This 
static, partial equilibrium model allows for multi-country modeling, to capture welfare effects of policies 
implemented at regional and global levels.  The partial equilibrium nature implies that analyses can be 
focused to tariff-line level (the source of tariff changes), and by aggregating all countries in which no 
policy changes are expected, the analysis can be focused only on those countries of interest. The model is 
detailed, utilizing comprehensive bilateral trade and tariff data at highly disaggregated levels, as well as 
data such as exports, domestic production and domestic absorption (captured as trade with self). The 
inclusion of export statistics adds the requirement of export market clearing to the global market clearing 
conditions, thus improving precision of results through consolidation of import and export trade flows, 
and enabling the analysis of global export market access policies. The inclusion of domestic production 
and absorption allows for the prediction of self-sufficiency effects, a critical policy issue in food markets. 
This framework also offers extensive analytical capacity compared to conventional partial equilibrium 
tools,  providing  for the analysis of simultaneous policy  changes in domestic  production, taxes or 
subsidies; export taxes or subsidies; and tariff rates. Compared to global general equilibrium models, the 
GSIM model is more  flexible,  allowing for disaggregated sector specific analysis while capable of 
maintaining global scope  –  computable general equilibrium models  typically  provide estimates at 
aggregate levels. GSIM also offers transparency, so that welfare evaluation, measured in explicit income 
terms, can be disaggregated into producer, consumer and state level effects; and sources of economic 
adjustments can be clearly identified (Francois and Hall 2003).  
The GSIM model is based upon the assumption of national product differentiation. The 
Armington assumption recognizes that commodities may not be homogenous across borders, implying 
that imports are imperfect substitutes of each other. In accordance with Armington 1969, we adopt the 
constant elasticity of substitution assumption for products competing in any market, so that elasticities 
are independent of market share and are the same between any pair of products competing in the same   6
market. Assuming weak separability of demand and homothetic preferences represented by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, we obtain an unambiguous demand for any subset of 
products in each market.  Both the elasticity of aggregate demand and elasticity of export supply are held 
constant; and import demand and export supply take on the log-linear form. Following Francois and Hall 
2003, the elements of the GSIM model can be summarized as:  
 
Import demand   M(i,v),r = f(P(i,v),r , P(i,v),s≠r  , y (i,v)) 
Export supply   Xi,r = f(P
w
i,r) 
Consumer price of good i  P(i,v),r = (1+ t(i,v),r ) P
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Where M(i,v),r is quantity of good i from region r in country v, P(i,v),r is its price and y(i,v) total expenditure in v on good i; Xi,r 
quantity of good i from region r ; t(i,v),r import taxes; P
w
i,r world price of i originating from region r; P(i,v) composite 
consumer price of i in region v;  N(i,v),(r,s) cross price elasticity; N(i,v)(r,r) own price elasticity; 㮀(i,v),s expenditure share of 
imports of i from s in region v; Em the composite demand elasticity in importing region v; Es elasticity of substitution; EX 
elasticity of export supply; T
0
(i,v),r initial tariff level on imports of good i from r into v; M
0
(i,v),r is the base quantities of i 

















i,r the benchmark export revenue for region r from exports of i . 
A few limitations of the GSIM model are noted. First, a partial equilibrium model, GSIM fails to capture 
inter-sectoral linkages, thus may suppress potentially significant economic interactions.  Consequently, 
gains/losses from tariff reforms tend to be overestimated, as resource re-allocation among sectors is not 
taken into account. This hypothesis is tested in section 4.5 by running comparable policy simulations 
using a global general equilibrium model – GTAP
7. Second, like most applied global models, GSIM is 
based on the representative agent assumption. However, in a region where diversity exists among 
different producer and consumer groups,  in terms of responsiveness to changes in income or prices, 
household welfare effects may differ non-trivially from aggregate effects. Price transmissions are also 
assumed  to  be  complete,  and  to  the  extent  that  changes  in  border  parity  prices  are  only  partially 
                                                   
6 Approximate value, since import demand is defined as a log-linear function, not a linear function as such.  
7 The GSIM model is chosen because it enables decomposition and quantification of welfare effects into monetary terms for different 
household groups – the study’s main objective. With GTAP welfare effects cannot be disaggregated into producer/consumer surplus.   7
transmitted to the household and producer levels, actual welfare responses to reforms may be less severe.  
 
4.   Empirical Application  
4.1  Data  
The data required for this analysis include (1)  bilateral trade volumes by source and destination, (2) 
domestic production and absorption, (3) tariff rates, and (4) elasticities of composite demand, supply and 
substitution. Data were obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, SADC 
Secretariat, GTAP Database, US  International  Trade  Commission  (USITC),  Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) database FAOSTAT, and national statistics offices.  Comprehensive bilateral trade 
data were available from WITS for 11 of the 13 SADC countries included in the study for a period of 4 
years from 1999 to 2002 (statistics for Angola and DRC were deduced from inverse sides of these 
statistics and from aggregate FAOSTAT statistics).  The sector ‘cereals’ is defined as all  grains and 
processed products of maize, wheat, rice, sorghum, millet, and other small grains
8 as they appear in 
Chapters 10 and 11 of the 2002 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. Using WITS 
elasticities and import volumes at tariff line level, sector elasticities of demand were computed by the 
import weighted average method, to obtain elasticities of ‘composite demand’ ranging from -0.55 to -
1.01 for the countries in the region. Specific duties were converted to their ad valorem equivalents using 
the  WTO  formula
9, and tariff rates were aggregated across tariff lines using the global unit value 
weighted sum method
10 to avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with import weighted averages. 
The analysis employed a symmetric supply elasticity  of 0.8 adopted from Jayne et al 1994, and an 
elasticity of substitution of -5 adopted from the USITC
11. Considering the usual sensitivity of results to 
choice of parameters such as elasticities, robustness tests were performed in Section 4.4, using varying 
elasticities of substitution and supply, and tariff rates obtained from the different tariff-line aggregation 
methods.    
                                                   
8 Includes rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, and canary seed. These collectivel y account for a very small percentage total trade volumes.  
9 Ad valorem Equivalent rate = Specific Duty x Quantity Imported ÷ Value of Imports at world prices 
10 ‘Global unit value’ is Global value of trade at tariff line level/Total quantities traded. 
11 USITC Office of Economic Research Note No. 2004-01-A   8
4.2  Simulations 
The policy simulations performed in this section included: (1) elimination of intra-regional  tariffs, 
assuming that SADC tariffs on ROW imports are maintained at current rates (to assess the potential 
impacts of tariff reforms in the cereals sector according to the SADC Trade protocol); (2) elimination of 
tariffs on imports from the region and the ROW (to compare welfare effects of intra-regional to global 
tariff reforms); and (3) exposure to external supply shock (to assess response to a supply shock in a 
SADC country, first in the absence of liberalization, then with liberalization).  
 
4.3   Results  
a.   Intra-regional versus MFN Tariff Reforms  
Results from the first 2 simulations are presented in table 2, with the parenthesized values representing 
results from the second simulation – indiscriminate elimination of tariffs on imports into SADC. 
 
Table 2: Intra-regional vs MFN Tariff Elimination 





















































































































































































































































































































































Effects of Intra-regional and (MFN) tariff elimination. 
At a sub-regional and country-level, results indicate that with intra-regional tariff reforms,  COMESA 
countries (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe) are expected to experience a decrease in producer prices,  as 
broader SADC tariff reforms encourage greater import response, and aggregate supply (output + imports   9
– exports) increases in each market. Domestic absorption and imports from each other generally drops (a 
result of preference erosion) as trade with other countries in the SADC region increases, whereas trade 
with the rest of the world decreases. The lower consumer prices imply gains in consumer surplus, and 
these outweigh the losses in producer surplus in all three countries, as expected for net importers from 
the region
12. Botswana follows similar trends, differing from other SACU countries mainly because of its 
relatively high trade with non-SACU SADC countries
13. Lower prices in these markets lead to increased 
imports into Botswana, hence lower prices. For the rest of SACU, prices are expected to increase, as the 
increase in exports to the SADC region outweighs the expected rise in both domestic output and total 
imports. As expected for net-importer SACU countries, the gains in producer surplus are outweighed by 
the losses in consumer surplus, and net welfare gains are generally negative – even when government 
revenue effects are not considered. For South Africa – a net-exporter – the increase in producer surplus 
exceeds the loss in consumer surplus and net welfare is positive. Notably, the general price trends differ 
between countries in the SACU free-trade region and those in COMESA, plausibly because in the SACU 
case when preferential access is extended to the whole region, it is still profitable for SACU countries to 
continue importing from South Africa, whereas for COMESA, SADC-wide tariff reforms reveal more 
profitable import sources and countries switch. For Mozambique, smaller price and welfare effects are 
expected,  not surprising given the already low tariff rates. Mozambique also imports only 4%  of 
domestic needs from SADC, and exports a similar proportion of local production, so that regional tariff 
reforms do not generate major responses on the domestic market. Tanzania is only different in that its 
tariff  rates are the highest in the region, however,  it  also trades more with the ROW (notably EAC 
countries) than with SADC (imports from SADC account for only 0.5% of local needs), and has high 
domestic absorption rates. Therefore intra-SADC tariff reforms, though triggering up to a 98% increase 
in trade with the region, also generate small responses on the domestic market. Both Tanzanian and 
Mozambican exports to the ROW currently face very low tariff rates, so that intra-SADC tariff reforms 
                                                   
12 Zimbabwe is a net exporter to the region, during the study period, but since the expected decrease in producer prices is almost twice the 
expected drop in consumer prices, we also get a net increase in (producer + consumer) surplus. 
13 Zimbabwe, for example, supplies 30% of Botswana’s cereals needs.   10 
provide limited incentive for increased trade
14. We note again that private net welfare effects (excluding 
government revenues) are also positive for these 2 countries. Overall, results from this simulation 
indicate that on net, elimination of intra-regional tariffs is welfare reducing for the region (a robust result, 
as indicated by the sensitivity tests performed in section 4.4). 
Unilateral elimination of tariffs on all imports, on the other hand, is welfare improving
15. These 
results are interesting in that they seem to indicate an absence of capacity in most of SADC to respond 
sufficiently to price incentives (aggregate supply also fails to respond, even with higher supply 
elasticities). The results  thus support the notion that exclusionary regional trade agreements could be 
welfare reducing, since they risk diverting trade away from more efficient producers, towards less 
efficient, preferred producers (Hoekman and Scheiff 2002). We observe that when tariff reforms are 
intra-regional, imports from the ROW drop for most net-importer SADC countries, while trade with the 
SADC region generally  increases (indicating trade diversion); whereas non-discriminate tariff reforms 
generally lead to increased imports from both the region and the world. South Africa appears to benefit 
from being both the largest producer in the region (produces about 50% of regional output) and a 
convenient market for ROW exports (due to location and relatively low protection rates compared to the 
ROW
16). Thus when only SADC trade is freed, both South Africa’s exports to SADC, and its imports 
from the ROW
17, increase. When the region opens to the global markets, this competitive edge is lost.  
b.  Response to Intra-Regional Supply shock  
In this simulation, the effects of a supply shock originating from one SADC country, South Africa, is 
evaluated – chosen because it is the only country that trades bilaterally with all of SADC
18. The effects of 
incremental hypothetical drops in South Africa’s output are evaluated and results from a 20% decrease in 
output presented here (inter-seasonal output variability in South Africa has ranged from -45% to 67% 
around the mean in the past 25years). Two simulations were run: first evaluating the effects of the supply 
                                                   
14 Both Mozambique and Tanzania are coastal countries thus trading with the world by sea may be cheaper than trading with the SADC 
region by rail or road. 
15Positive net welfare effects are also expected if only external tariffs are eliminated, maintaining current tariffs on imports from the region.   
16 Import-weighted tariff rates in the cereal world market is about 38%, WITS 2005 
17 In response to higher internal prices in the South African market. Notice that South Africa’s tariff revenues increase as well.  
18 Ordinarily, given the similarity in climatic conditions for distinct subsets within the region, climate related supply shocks will likely affect 
more than one country. To maintain tractabili ty of the analysis, we assume that the supply shock is only experienced in one country.   11 
shock in the absence of tariff reforms, then after region-wide tariff reforms. The results presented in 
Table 3 indicate that a supply shock generated in South Africa is likely to cause major price increases 
throughout the region, highest for SACU countries and lowest for countries whose trade with South 
Africa is limited, such as  Tanzania. Domestic absorption is also expected to increase universally 
(countries reduce exports), but aggregate supply is expected to drop in each country due to lower imports 
from the region.  The magnitude of these responses seems to not change much after tariff reforms, 
although in this case, the price increases expected for SACU countries is lower, and that for the rest of 
the region higher, than in the restricted trade case. Tariff reforms therefore seem to serve the purpose of 
spreading risk of a supply shock, making it less intense for South Africa and other SACU countries, and 
more intense for the rest of SADC, considering though that the differences are small. 
 
Table 3: 20% Production Shock in South Africa   
   Composite 
Consumer Price  
(% change) 
Regional 
Imports   
(% change) 
Regional 
Exports   









Botswana  4.97 (4.56)  -10.35 (-9.15)  2.88 (2.70)  7.08 (6.79)  -7.43 (-6.70)  -3 310 (-3 283) 
Lesotho  5.60 (5.50)  -13.56 (-13.40)  0.76 (0.75)  5.22 (5.12)  -4.70 (-4.48)  -2 520 (-2 469) 
Malawi  1.43 (1.56)  -12.97 (-12.32)  0.01 (-0.09)  1.38 (1.52)  0.33 (0.32)  -1 903 (-1 828) 
Mozambique  0.52 (0.58)  -31.51 (-30.74)  4.21 (4.56)  0.37 (0.38)  -0.27 (-0.34)  -811 (-755) 
Namibia  3.14 (3.05)  -24.6 (-24.32)  2.80 (2.64)  3.83 (3.98)  -2.33 (-2.23)  -1 025 (-998) 
South Africa  6.60 (6.48)  9.97 (10.24)  -24.4 (-25)  -11.50 (-11.40)  -6.56 (-6.39)  11 837 (14 414) 
Swaziland   6.28 (6.17)  -11.38 (-11.25)  0.75 (0.51)  6.90 (6.82)  -5.26 (-5.14)  -2 210 (-2 170) 
Tanzania  0.09 (0.13)  -28.16 (-27.36)  4.90 (4.97)  0.04 (0.08)  -0.06 (-0.13)  -425 (-317) 
Zambia  1.51 (1.76)  -22.98 (-23.78)  4.52 (2.90)  1.60 (1.88)  -1.95 (-2.41)  -2 854 (-2 688) 
Zimbabwe  1.22 (1.56)  -28.30 (-27.36)  9.25 (8.20)  0.90 (1.25)  -1.20 (-1.89)  -4 036 (-3 407) 
otherSADC  0.29 (0.37)  -28.70 (-27.84)  7.83 (8.34)  0.29 (0.36)  -0.18 (-0.32)  -1 879 (-1 572) 
*Pre and (post) tariff reform effects   
4.4   Sensitivity Analyses  
Results from the sensitivity tests support the overall results discussed in section 4.3, if not with similar 
magnitudes of change, at least with the same direction of change. Higher supply elasticities are 
associated with smaller producer price effects and larger output effects than those predicted with an 
export supply elasticity of 0.8. However,  even at very  high elasticity values of say 100, net welfare 
effects are still negative for most of SADC, although SACU countries fare better with higher regional 
output responses. Lower elasticities of substitution are consistent with lower quantity and price   12 
responses, hence smaller welfare effects. Here again, increasing degree of substitutability by as much as 
twenty-fold will neither affect the expected direction of change, nor move the region into the positive net 
welfare range. Different tariff aggregation methods produce, in specific cases
19, some non-trivial 
differences in sector-level tariff protection rates. These differences translate to some significant 
differences in net welfare effects. When the higher ‘simple average’ tariff rates are used, for example, a 
few additional countries would now expect positive net welfare gains from intra-regional tariff reforms, 
an indication that if indeed effective protection in this highly regulated sector exceeds tariff rates used in 
this analysis, the net welfare effects computed here would be an underestimation of what we can expect 
with full-fledged trade policy reforms.  
A General Equilibrium Assessment:  
To compute the expected welfare effects of tariff reforms in a general equilibrium setting, the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
 20 was used. In addition to allowing for inter-sectoral adjustments, this 
analysis also captures a unique feature of the SADC cereals sector: the fact that producer and consumer 
groups are not always mutually exclusive, by assuming a single regional household that is both an owner 
of the factors of production and a consumer. In comparing results, we note that because the GSIM and 
GTAP models are based on different underlying  assumptions  about  the structure of  preferences, 
measures of welfare and underlying data such as elasticities, country group aggregation and tariff line 
concordances,  direct comparisons of results would be erroneous.  Processed cereals, for example, are 
aggregated into the broader ‘food’ sector in GTAP, and it is not clear that the tariff aggregation method 
for each sector is similar to that used in the GSIM model in this study. Therefore the purpose of the 
sensitivity analysis is not to make one-for-one comparisons of predicted welfare effects, but to evaluate 
the robustness of the general trends predicted by the GSIM analysis.  
                                                   
19 In Malawi, for example, the average tariff rate obtained from the import weighted average aggregation method is 1 percent, whereas the 
global unit value weighted sum  method gives a 4 percent rate, and the simple average method a 16 percent rate. 
20 The GTAP model is a static general equilibrium model, comprising a regional household involved in consumption, savings and 
government spending decisions, where expenditure is distributed in fixed shares among these household decisions. The model assumes a 
Cobb Douglas aggregate utility function modeled through a non-homothetic CDE function, that simplifies to a CES function elasticity of 
substitution is assumed constant. Changes in private incomes and utility from policy reforms is measured by the percentage change in 
private utility in a given region, which is a function of changes in private household incomes (the sum of the value household 
endowments), the share of the specific good in total consumption, and the income elasticity of demand (Hertel, 1997).    13 
In this simulation, intra-regional tariffs are eliminated on cereals imported from the SADC region, but 
maintained on cereals imported from the world. With a few exceptions
21, the general trend in expected 
welfare responses is similar to that expected in the GSIM model, though at smaller magnitudes. Notably, 
net welfare effects are either negative or almost negligible for most of SADC, COMESA countries are 
still expected to experience drops in producer and consumer prices, producer prices are expected to 
increase in SACU countries, welfare gains are highest for South Africa, and negligible welfare effects are 
expected for Tanzania. Domestic absorption is still expected to drop universally, and the supply response 
to be small. These results thus seem to highlight similar trends and support the earlier conclusion that 
expected price and welfare effects of  intra-regional tariff reforms in the cereals sector of the SADC 
region are small and generally negative
22.  
Table 3: General Equilibrium Assessment, GTAP model  














(% change)  
Overall Welfare 
Effects  
(% change ) 
Botswana  -0.02  0  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.03 
Malawi  -1.54  -0.23  -0.94  -13.74  -0.42  -0.29 
Mozambique  -0.38  -0.09  -0.39  -4.75  -0.25  -0.19 
South Africa  0.03  0.06  0.64  -0.63  3.64  2.55 
otherSACU  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.04  0.04 
Tanzania  -0.04  -0.01  0.03  -0.51  -0.08  0.00 
Zambia  -0.55  -0.14  -0.87  -8.37  -0.07  0.01 
Zimbabwe  -0.16  -0.02  -0.2  -5.32  -0.17  -0.11 
otherSADC  -0.57  -0.04  -0.2  20.26  -0.21  -0.10 
 
5.  Conclusion and Areas of Further Research  
This study uses the GSIM model to evaluate the welfare effects of tariff reforms in the cereals sector of 
the SADC region. The objective is to assess if intra-regional tariff reforms hold the potential to improve 
food security in the SADC region, through increased physical and economic assess to food. Results from 
the analysis indicate that intra-regional tariff reforms alone would have small price and output effects in 
the short run, with negative net welfare effects expected for all but South Africa. In the best case 
                                                   
21Botswana and Mozambique: with price and welfare effects expected to be smaller and slightly higher respectively, than earlier predicted. 
22 We also note that because applied welfare analyses, such as the one performed here, are second best evaluations that take into account the 
policy distortions already in existence in an economy, in principle, trade liberalization may fail to improve welfare if it leads to resource re-
allocation from one distorted sector to an even more distorted one (Francois and Reinert, 1997).    14 
scenario, when  only ‘private’ net welfare effects  are considered  (by  excluding  government revenue 
losses), positive regional net welfare is expected – implying increased private incomes.  However when 
government revenues are included, results indicate that overall income available to pursue physical and 
economic access to food would decrease with intra-regional tariff reforms. Combined with reforms of 
external tariffs, regional and national net welfare is expected to increase considerably from region-wide 
tariff reforms, although at higher costs to regional producers. Therefore, if the objective of the tariff 
reforms in SADC’s cereals sector is to improve regional wealth, as a means for improved economic 
access to food, intra-regional tariff elimination, on its own, is not a sufficient policy option.
23.  
A few caveats to the general conclusions drawn above are in order. First, food security is 
generally a household phenomenon, and although this study attempts to disaggregate welfare effects at 
national producer and consumer level, a deeper understanding of household decomposition for each 
country would shed more light on the more micro level effects of the reforms discussed in this paper. 
Second, this study uses annual data, and while these data capture inter-seasonal variability of quantity 
and price trends within the study period, they mask intra-seasonal variability – an important component 
of food security especially for vulnerable consumer groups. This study, while indicating increased grain 
mobility within the region as a result of tariff reforms, does not address the issue of continuity in supply 
at regional, national and household levels. Lastly, the quantitative analyses performed here enable us to 
evaluate only the welfare effects resulting from tariff reforms, and do not capture either the potential 
implications of concurrent non-tariff responses, such as improved trade policy coordination and border 
efficiencies, or the effects of removing non-tariff barriers to trade.  Non-tariff barriers, where they exist, 
imply higher effective rates of protection, and their removal – higher price and welfare effects. 
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